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THE ARMY’S G-RAP FIASCO: 
HOW THE LIVES AND CAREERS 
OF HUNDREDS OF INNOCENT SOLDIERS 
WERE DESTROYED  
JEFFREY F. ADDICOTT* 
“We believe those [National Guardsmen who worked in the G-RAP] 
still being investigated are unfairly being targeted and that the result of the investigation 
has ruined lives, careers, marriages, and credit; indeed, some have opted for suicide 
to end the relentless harassment.”1 
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School of Law.  This article was prepared under the auspices of the Warrior Defense Project (WDP) 
located at St. Mary’s University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas.  Dr. Addicott is a retired Army 
Lieutenant Colonel, who served in senior legal positions throughout the world as a Judge Advocate, and 
now specializes in National Security law.  The WDP’s mission includes the study of legal issues that 
impact military readiness as well as providing pro bono representation to military personnel wrongfully 
accused of misconduct in the performance of their duties.  The author wishes to acknowledge with 
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Salinas, who supported this article with outstanding research, drafting, and editing.  
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I.    INTRODUCTION 
One of the untoward realities of any criminal justice system—either in terms 
of investigations or prosecutions—is that mistakes and errors sometimes 
occur, causing great harm to the innocent.  While substantive and procedural 
safeguards have evolved over time and experience to prevent or rectify these 
injustices ab initio, sometimes there emerges a systemic breakdown of such 
magnitude that it simply overwhelms even the most sacred of our Anglo-Saxon 
values—that a person is innocent until proven guilty. 
Such is the case with what was the largest criminal investigation in the 
history of the Army’s Criminal Investigation Command, Criminal 
Investigation Division, more commonly known as the “CID.”  Code-named 
“Task Force Raptor,” the Army-wide criminal probe saw over 200 CID agents 
“investigate” tens of thousands of Army National Guard and Army Reserve 
personnel ostensibly to root out individuals thought to have engaged in white-
collar styled crimes as participants in the legally flawed and now defunct Army 
National Guard Recruiting Assistance Program (G-RAP) and/or the Army 
Reserve Recruiting Assistance Program (AR-RAP).  Both programs were 
conceived out of a need to bolster troop strength due to personnel shortages 
that occurred in the Global War on Terror (GWOT).2  
 
2. The term “Global War on Terror” (also called the “War on Terror”) has been used both as 
a metaphor to describe a general conflict against all radical Islamic international terrorist groups, and 
2
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Although the vast majority of those targeted were innocent of any 
wrongdoing whatsoever, many were nonetheless branded as suspected 
criminals and “titled” as such in CID Reports of Investigation (ROI) for crimes 
that they did not commit.  And those were the fortunate.  Some of the innocent 
soldiers were also prosecuted in U.S. federal criminal courts and sentenced to 
prison terms, while others were subjected to punishment through criminal and 
administrative processes in the military’s justice system. 
The purpose of this article is three-fold.  First, this article seeks to explore 
the legal and policy ramifications of the CID’s multi-year criminal 
investigation, which targeted vast numbers of innocent Army National Guard 
and Army Reserve personnel for alleged criminality as contract employees in 
the G-RAP or AR-RAP. 
Second, this article aims to highlight the CID’s longstanding practice—
referred to as “titling”—of refusing to delete from their system of records 
those individuals that are subsequently cleared of any wrongdoing by their 
commands.  This highly dubious administrative practice was particularly 
devastating to the hundreds of innocent and fully-exonerated participants in 
the G-RAP and AR-RAP in terms of promotions, security clearances, and job 
selection both in the military and civilian world. 
Finally, this article will call direct attention to the need for congressional 
action to amend the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act (WSLA)3 so that 
the current suspension of the statute of limitations does not apply to those 
soldiers who participated in the G-RAP and AR-RAP.  Not only does the 
current version of the WSLA (as amended by the Wartime Enforcement of 
 
to describe the combat operations against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in 2001 and Saddam Hussein in 
2003.  The more precise use of the term is to describe the ongoing international armed conflict between 
the United States of America and the “Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces.”  Military Commissions 
Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, 10 U.S.C. § 948 (2006).  One of the clearest 
indications of the congressional authorization for war and for the use of the law of war, the MCA lists 
“unlawful enemy combatants” as: 
(i) a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially supported 
hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful enemy combatant 
(including a person who is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces); or 
(ii) a person who, before, on, or after the date of the enactment of the Military Commissions Act 
of 2006, has been determined to be an unlawful enemy combatant by a Combatant Status Review 
Tribunal or another competent tribunal established under the authority of the President or the 
Secretary of Defense. 
Id. § 948(a). 
3. Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (1948). 
3
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Fraud Act) violate the long-recognized principle of repose, it irresponsibly 
blurs the line between civilian contractors and military contractors and casts 
too broad a net over what reasonably constitutes “wartime” activities. 
II.    THE G-RAP 
As of this writing, America is still engaged in the longest war in its 
illustrious history.4  The GWOT is a multi-dimensional conflict that began 
on September 11, 2001, when nineteen members of the radical Islamic al-
Qaeda network attacked the United States by means of hijacked airplanes.5  
The terror network al-Qaeda was “headquartered” in Afghanistan and 
openly operated under the protection of the Taliban government.  Since that 
time, the GWOT has been fought on numerous overseas battlefields by 
American ground troops from the active-duty military augmented by forces 
from the Army National Guard and Army Reserve.  While the GWOT most 
certainly serves as a reminder of the importance of the Army National 
Guard6 and Army Reserve as essential components to maintaining the 
nation’s military readiness, both the Army National Guard and Army 
Reserve have periodically struggled to achieve proper force levels—even in 
“peace time”7 environments. 
While the GWOT began with the al-Qaeda terror attacks, the 
United States and its allies soon expanded the conflict by targeting the rogue 
regime of Saddam Hussein in 2003.8  For better or worse, Iraq quickly 
 
4. See William J. Astore, The Longest War in American History Has No End in Sight, NATION 
(Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/the-longest-war-in-american-history-has-no-end-
in-sight/ [https://perma.cc/G4KA-XE7U] (indicating the war in Afghanistan is now in its sixteenth 
year which makes it the longest foreign war in our history); Thomas Nagorski, Editor’s Notebook: Afghan 
War Now Country’s Longest, ABC NEWS (June 7, 2010, 3:00 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/ 
Politics/afghan-war-now-longest-war-us-history/story?id=10849303 [https://perma.cc/Q9RY-
T3AE] (“And today ‘The Other War’ has gained a fresh and dubious distinction: it is the longest war 
in our nation’s history, surpassing the conflict in Vietnam.”). 
5. See generally JEFFREY F. ADDICOTT, RADICAL ISLAM WHY? (2016) (providing a general 
background discussion of the concept of radical Islam). 
6. See Our History, ARMY NAT’L GUARD, https://www.nationalguard.com/legacy 
[https://perma.cc/Q6UP-CF4V] (“National Guard Soldiers serve both community and country.  Our 
versatility enables us to respond to domestic emergencies, overseas combat missions, counterdrug 
efforts, reconstruction missions and more.”). 
7. John Warner et al., The Military Recruiting Productivity Slowdown: The Roles of Resources, Opportunity 
Cost and the Tastes of Youth, 14 DEFENCE & PEACE ECON. 329, 333 (2003). 
8. Rowan Scarborough, Numbers Show National Guard Bonus Scandal Not Living Up to the Hype, 
WASH. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2016), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/feb/11/national-
guard-fraud-claims-taint-recruiting-assis/ [https://perma.cc/DU9B-5FCB]. 
4
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became part of the GWOT.  Among other issues of concern in providing 
stability to the new interim Iraqi government, the need for additional 
American ground troops weighed heavily as a key ingredient for success.  
Back home, however, the active-duty Army was short on personnel, and by 
2005, over 100,000 Army National Guard soldiers were already on federal 
active duty.9  Although Congress sets troop authorizations under its 
Article I powers,10 no politician seemed serious about calling for a 
mandatory national draft of young men to meet the increased needs.  
Instead, military planners turned to the state’s Army National Guard, 
looking for more volunteers to “federalize.”11  In the context of this 
discussion, in July 2005, the Army National Guard counted roughly 330,000 
soldiers—20,000 short of Congress’s authorization.12  Due to the shortages, 
novel steps were taken to bolster recruitment, including the adoption of a 
highly-irregular recruiting assistance scheme—the G-RAP.13 
A. DOCUPAK 
In 2005, the Army awarded Document and Packaging Brokers, Inc. 
(DOCUPAK)—a private civilian corporation operating out of Birmingham, 
Alabama—an extremely lucrative government contract to administer G-
RAP.14  The mission of G-RAP was simple.  “[G-RAP and later AR-RAP] 
 
9. NAT’L GUARD ASS’N OF THE U.S., THE G-RAP PROGRAM: THE INVESTIGATIONS AND  
AN INJECTION OF REALITY 1, http://www.defendourprotectors.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/G-
RAP-Program-The-Investigations-and-an-Injection-of-Reality.pdf [https://perma.cc/ETR3-DNRJ] 
[hereinafter NGA G-RAP REPORT]. 
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. 
11. Scarborough, supra note 8. 
12. Bob Haskell, Army Guard Reaches 350,000-Member Goal Ahead of Schedule, NAT’L GUARD 
(Apr. 23, 2007), https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article-View/Article/572952/army-guard-
reaches-350000-member-goal-ahead-of-schedule/ [https://perma.cc/TG6X-2C6P]. 
13. See NGA G-RAP REPORT, supra note 9, at 1 (explaining when Hurricane Katrina hit the 
Gulf Coast of the United States in August of 2005, an additional 50,000 National Guard were needed 
for this domestic disaster). 
14. See United States v. Osborne, 886 F.3d 604, 606 (6th Cir. 2018) (explaining  
DOCUPAK’s role in the G-RAP program).  Although the official website for G-RAP 
(www.guardrecruitingassistant.com) cannot be found, the Defend Our Protectors website  
has compiled AR-RAP and G-RAP marketing and other informational materials which have  
been cited throughout.  Resources, DEFEND OUR PROTECTORS, http://www.defendourprotectors.com 
/resources/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2020).  See also Memorandum from the Subcomm. on Fin. and 
Contracting Oversight Majority Staff, to Members of the Subcomm. on Fin. and Contracting Oversight 
(Feb. 13, 2014), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Army%20Recruiting%20Memo%20 
for%20Members%20and%20Staff%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/GC7R-TVQV] [hereinafter 
5
Addicott: The Army’s G-RAP Fiasco
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2019
  
554 ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:549 
was designed to be a recruitment tool to supplement the recruiting activities of 
full-time [Army] recruiters during a time of increased demand for soldiers 
in a depressed recruiting market . . . [by leveraging] soldiers to identify, 
mentor, and sponsor potential candidates for enlistment.”15 
Any National Guard soldier, except an Army National Guard soldier who 
was a Recruiter,16 could quickly become qualified to work in G-RAP by 
completing a rather simplistic online DOCUPAK course of instruction.  
Once this short online session was done, the soldier would be officially 
designated as a DOCUPAK “recruiting assistant” (RA).17  Accordingly, 
RA’s were compensated directly through DOCUPAK based on fulfilling 
certain ill-defined and often conflicting DOCUPAK instructions, which 
centered on the RA discussing the benefits of joining the Army National 
Guard (and later the Army Reserve) with a civilian who might be interested 
in joining the military.  In the DOCUPAK literature, such a civilian was 
termed as a potential soldier (PS).18  The PS could be any civilian that the 
RA might encounter from “within their individual spheres of influence.”19  
 
Memorandum to the Members of the Subcomm. on Fin. and Contracting Oversight] (providing a 
background and  summarization of the G-RAP program). 
15. NGA G-RAP REPORT, supra note 9, at 1. 
16. Because Army National Guard Recruiters were paid for recruiting Potential Soldiers, they 
were not eligible to be Recruiting Assistants.  See Testimony of Philip Crane at 124, Colorado v. Wilson, 
No. 14CR327 (C.D. Col. 2015) (explaining Recruiting Assistants were hired and trained by 
DOCUPAK). 
17. Id. at 123–24. 
 18. G-RAP FAQ: Overview of the Guard Recruiting Assistance Program, DEFEND OUR 
PROTECTORS 1, http://www.defendourprotectors.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/G-RAP_1. 
5.pdf [https://perma.cc/8F97-YRZ7]. 
19. Guard-Recruiting Assistance Program: From Recruiting and Retention Command, GUARDLIFE, 
https://www.state.nj.us/militar/publications/guardlife/volume32no1/grap.html [https://perma.cc/ 
PBB9-NN6U].  As was done in all States, the New Jersey National Guard strongly encouraged its 
National Guard personnel to join the G-RAP, placing great emphasis on the “easy money” to be had.  
The New Jersey National Guard advertisement stated: 
New Jersey Guard Recruiting Assistants can earn additional income assisting the NJARNG 
recruiting efforts by identifying well qualified men and women for service.  Recruiter Assistants 
(RAs) earn $2,000 for each new recruit who enlists and reports for Basic Training.  The RA can 
also earn $2,000 for a prior service applicant who enlists in the NJARNG. . . .  Guardsmen who 
apply online at www.guardrecuritingassitant.com become eligible to serve as a part-time Recruiter 
Assistant (RA).  The RA applicant will be verified and hired by a contractor [DOCUPAK], not 
the NJARNG. . . .  The triad of the NJARMG recruiter, RA and potential Soldier will then work 
closely together to process the potential Soldier and move them towards accession.  Upon 
enlistment the RA will receive an initial payment of $1,000.  A second $1,000 payment will be 
given when a non-prior service applicant ships to Basic Training or when a prior service applicant 
6
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The DOCUPAK vision was that a triad, consisting of the RA, the Army 
Recruiter (who would actually enlist the PS), and the PS would all interact 
together to move the PS to accession into the National Guard.20 
Upon making contact with a PS, the RA was instructed to enter basic 
information about each PS whom they contacted into the DOCUPAK 
online network, including personally identifiable information (PII) such as 
name, address, and social security number.21  When the subject PS enlisted, 
the RA would receive compensation through DOCUPAK: $1,000 for every 
PS who signed an enlistment contract and then an additional $1,000 when 
the new enlistee went to basic training.22  Other higher-level bonuses were 
offered to RAs for officers who joined the National Guard.  DOCUPAK 
also benefited financially each time a PS joined.  On the DOCUPAK side 
of the equation, in addition to “operational” costs associated with the 
contract, DOCUPAK received an extra bounty of $325 on each payment to 
an RA.23 
When asked to describe the fundamental workings of DOCUPAK, Philip 
Crane, the company’s former president testified in district court in Adams 
County, Colorado that DOCUPAK was a marketing and advertising 
company, stating that “[i]n this particular instance, our focus was on 
providing services to the United States government Department of Defense 
for recruiting and retention purposes.”24  Philip Crane also testified that 
DOCUPAK was merely a “force multiplier.” 
[DOCUPAK] encouraged members in good standing of the Army National 
Guard to go out and to share their story with other individuals who might 
have a propensity to also serve in the military . . . the RAs would share their 
stories [about the benefits of serving in the Army National Guard] within their 
 
has completed four months of drill.  Do the Math: You get $2,000 for every person you recruit 
into the New Jersey Army National Guard.  Don’t let Guard be New Jersey’s best kept secret. 
Id. 
 20. See G-RAP FAQ, supra note 18, at 1 (providing an overview of the G-RAP program and 
how it works).  
 21. G-RAP Overview, DEFEND OUR PROTECTORS 7, http://www.defendourprotectors.com/ 
wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Rules_Version1.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LP2-Z6H3]. 
22. NGA G-RAP REPORT, supra note 9, at 1. 
23. Testimony of Philip Crane at 5, Colorado v. Wilson, No. 14CR327 (C.D. Col. 2015). 
24. Id. at 105. 
7
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sphere of influence, whether it be a community center, high school, church, 
or any other place of worship.25 
In short, the military contracted with DOCUPAK to administer recruiting 
programs for the “Army, the big Army, and the National Guard,”26 with 
essentially zero oversight on how the program actually functioned.  Then, 
two years after G-RAP began, the Army Reserve launched AR-RAP in 2007, 
which was also administered by DOCUPAK with similar rules for the RA 
to recruit a PS.27 
G-RAP proved to be extremely successful.  By April 2007, the Army 
National Guard achieved the congressionally-authorized strength number 
of 350,000 troops.28  Nevertheless, the two recruiting programs continued 
to operate under DOCUPAK even though no actual need was 
demonstrated for them to continue.29  Before the two recruiting programs 
were unceremoniously shut down in 2012, approximately 150,000 recruits, 
Army-wide, joined either the National Guard or the Army Reserve resulting 
in payments of over $300 million.30  
Given the extremely minimalist rules regarding how an RA would work 
in order to receive payment under G-RAP and AR-RAP,31 it was not 
surprising that certain unscrupulous individuals engaged in fraudulent 
activities to get DOCUPAK to pay out money that was not earned.  In 2007, 
the same year the Army reached its National Guard troop level, the Army’s 
CID investigated several cases of alleged abuse.  Two scenarios of fraud 
were uncovered.  First, there were instances where some RAs were 
suspected of sharing their payment money with Army National Guard 
Recruiters who had improperly fed the name of a particular PS to an RA 
with the premeditated agreement to split the money that the RA received 
for entering the PS in the DOCUPAK system for payment.  Since it was 
illegal for an Army Recruiter to accept money apart from their fixed Army 
 
25. Id. at 6, 9. 
26. Id. at 5. 
27. William Nutter, Recruiting Assistants, New Programs, Help Boost Army Reserve Numbers, 
U.S. ARMY (Aug. 1, 2007), https://www.army.mil/article/4237/recruiting_assistants_new_programs_ 
help_boost_army_reserve_numbers [https://perma.cc/5JSJ-ESAQ]. 
28. NGA G-RAP REPORT, supra note 9, at 1. 
29. In fact, the National Guard Bureau overpaid DOCUPAK by $9.2 million.  Testimony of 
Philip Crane at 106, Wilson, No. 14CR327 (C.D. Col. 2015). 
30. Memorandum to the Members of the Subcomm. on Fin. and Contracting Oversight, supra 
note 14, at 2; Scarborough, supra note 8. 
31. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
8
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salary for recruiting enlistees, this constituted a prima facie case of fraud 
under federal criminal statutes.  Second, an RA would simply input for 
payment from DOCUPAK the name of a PS that they had never met, which 
was sometimes accomplished by hacking into the computer system.  
Perhaps the biggest ring of abuse was uncovered in San Antonio, Texas, 
where a group of individuals had managed to rake in as much as $244,000 
from DOCUPAK.32  The reports of fraud led to the erroneous belief of a 
systemic nationwide scandal in G-RAP and AR-RAP.33   
The death blow to DOCUPAK and the G-RAP and AR-RAP came in 
the wake of an Army Audit Agency program-wide audit completed in 
2011.34  By the beginning of March 2012, the findings of this investigation35 
gained intense publicity due to the media’s “sensational headlines based on 
half-truths, innuendo, and anonymous government leaks.”36  For example, 
the Washington Post reported on March 13, 2012, that $92 million in bonuses 
were allegedly paid to Army Recruiters who were not eligible for the 
payments, and that more than a quarter of the $339 million in bonuses 
given over the past six years may have been fraudulent.37  In turn, an Army 
Inspector General Report from 2014 cited eight general officers and senior 
civilian officials for suspected wrongdoing, echoing the earlier Army Audit 
Agency findings that the entire DOCUPAK government contract itself was 
illegally established in allowing a private civilian company to disburse cash 
 
32. NGA G-RAP REPORT, supra note 9, at 6. 
33. Memorandum to the Members of the Subcomm. on Fin. and Contracting Oversight, supra 
note 14, at 2; Scarborough, supra note 8. 
34. Memorandum to the Members of the Subcomm. on Fin. and Contracting Oversight, supra 
note 14, at 2; Scarborough, supra note 8. 
35. See NGA G-RAP REPORT, supra note 9, at 1 (noting the Department of Defense and the 
Army Audit Agency has conducted at least five separate audits of G-RAP with “five additional 
investigations and reviews by the Army, all under a Recruiting Assistance Program Task Force” set up 
by the Secretary of the Army). 
36. Id.; see Robert O’Harrow Jr., Fraud Investigation Targets Recruiting Program for Army National Guard, 
Reserves, WASH. POST (Mar. 13, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/fraud-
investigation-targets-recruiting-program-for-army-national-guard/reserves/2012/03/12/gIQAp1QXAS 
_story.html?utm_term=.a0a0dd4ca5e0 [https://perma.cc/3CEZ-3PNZ] (discussing the shocking 
allegation of wide-ranging fraud in the Army National Guard’s recruitment program that is the subject 
of a Pentagon fraud investigation); Army Cancels Recruitment Program After Allegations of Bonus  
Payout Fraud, FOX NEWS (Mar. 14, 2012), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/army-cancels-
recruitment-program-after-allegations-of-bonus-payout-fraud [https://perma.cc/52L6-ARKB] (reporting 
1,700 service members could be implicated in the recruiting scandal totaling over 92 million dollars in 
fraudulent bonuses). 
37. O’Harrow Jr., supra note 36. 
9
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payments to military personnel designated as RAs.38  While the innocent 
low-level RAs who worked for DOCUPAK as instructed had no part in 
setting up G-RAP, they immediately became tainted. 
As stated, the independent inquiries rapidly brought about the 
termination of G-RAP and AR-RAP in January 2012.39  However, while calls 
for accountability intensified—causing congressional interest—the DOD tasked the 
CID with undergoing a massive crusade to investigate any RA involved with G-RAP.  
Someone had to pay.  Often described as “witch hunts,” the CID ruthlessly 
targeted hundreds upon hundreds of innocent rank-and-file RAs who had, 
under the parameters of the DOCUPAK contract, simply followed the 
actual G-RAP and AR-RAP rules to receive payment for their work.40  
Guilty of only complying with the highly dubious and often contradictory 
mandates set out by DOCUPAK in the G-RAP rules, very few of the RAs 
were able to afford experienced civilian lawyers to defend themselves from 
baseless allegations of criminality, particularly if they were facing criminal 
charges in federal district courts.   
Ironically, while the 2011 Army audit detailed profound deficiencies at 
DOCUPAK to include the very premise upon which the program was 
constructed, blame was shifted to the low-level RAs who bore the brunt of 
the ensuing CID onslaught.  Code-named “Task Force Raptor,” over 
two hundred CID investigators set out to determine whether over 
100,000 RAs had committed crimes.41  According to one watchdog group, 
“[R]ather than accept responsibility for ineffective command and for 
mismanagement of a contract worth a half a billion dollars, military brass 
 
38. Rowan Scarborough, Army Top Brass Skirt Punishment in Fraud Probe as Lower Ranks Take 
Blame, WASH. POST (Mar. 13, 2016), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/mar/13/army-
top-brass-skirt-punishment-in-fraud-probe-as-/ [https://perma.cc/GH4G-X5ER]. 
39. Memorandum to the Members of the Subcomm. on Fin. and Contracting Oversight, supra 
note 14, at 2. 
40. See generally Darron Smith & Liz Ullman, The Silent Campaign by the US Government to Brand 
American Soldiers as Criminals, HUFF. POST (Jun. 05, 2015, 5:20 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/ 
entry/the-silent-campaign-by-th_b_7521228 [https://perma.cc/A4B2-A5JK] (“But the federal 
government has not been satisfied with that level of justice; they intend to extract its ‘pound of flesh’ 
from this failed incentive program, and they intend to do so by waging silent war against innocent and 
vulnerable soldiers who tried in earnest to follow the rules as best they knew how.”). 
41. Dave Philipps, Army Fraud Crackdown Uses Broad Net to Catch Small Fish, Some Unfairly,  
N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/28/us/national-guard-army-fraud-
crackdown.html [https://perma.cc/J4S2-QE99]. 
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redirected this uncomfortable inquiry to the rank-in-file soldiers [who 
served as RAs] . . . .”42 
B. Task Force Raptor 
While there is no question that Task Force Raptor constituted the largest 
and most expensive CID investigation in the history of the Army (estimates 
of between 30 to 60 million dollars spent),43 it soon became apparent to 
many that the investigation and the investigatory techniques employed by 
the CID were rampant with shocking levels of abuse, incompetence, and 
mismanagement.  
Shockingly, in every Report of Investigation (ROI) that targeted a 
“suspect,” the particular CID agent would not list the specific G-RAP or AR-
RAP rule which an alleged RA wrongdoer had allegedly violated.  Instead, 
criminal allegations were set out as violations of various Title 18 United 
States Code offenses such as “wire fraud”44 (for receiving payment from 
DOCUPAK without performing the required work) or “aggravated identity 
theft”45 (for improperly obtaining PII from a PS).  Amazingly, no one 
seemed to notice that if the RA followed the published G-RAP rules, they 
were not committing fraud!  Clearly, no G-RAP rule violations were cited in 
the ROIs simply because it was far easier to allege “fraud” as a general 
principle than to tie wrongdoing to a specific G-RAP rule.   
At the end of the day, the red thread throughout all the ROIs reflected 
the unwritten perception that it was preposterous for an RA to claim 
substantial monetary rewards from DOCUPAK for simply engaging a PS in 
as little as a one-time conversation about the benefits of joining the Army 
National Guard or the Army Reserve.  However, as the former president of 
DOCUPAK testified, a single conversation of unspecified length about the 
benefits of joining the Army National Guard (or Army Reserve) with a PS 
was all the RA was required to accomplish according to the G-RAP rules 
 
42. Rowan Scarborough, Army Brass Avoid Rap in Recruitment Fraud Probe: Lower Ranks Take Brunt 
of Blame, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2016, at A6; Smith & Ullman, supra note 40. 
43. See Phillips, supra note 41 (stating Task Force Raptor “has grown into one of the largest 
criminal investigations ever conducted in the military”). 
44. Rowan Scarborough, Army National Guard Recruitment Fraud Case Rests on Murky Rules, WASH. 
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before submitting the name for a future lawful payment should that PS 
eventually enlist.46 
Of course, one of the largest inhibitors to investigating any given case of 
alleged G-RAP abuse was the duration of time from when an alleged 
incident occurred, in some instances, nine to ten years had elapsed from the 
time when the RA had made contact with a PS.  This directly impacted the 
ability of witnesses to recall and relate events as well as the CID’s ability to 
obtain reliable information.  Indeed, it would be rather unreasonable to 
expect any given PS to recall a conversation with an RA that took place years 
ago—some even ten years on. 
C. The Case of Major John Suprynowicz 
One case that warranted two front-page national headlines from the 
Washington Times perfectly illustrates the almost unbelievable multi-year 
nightmare visited on a completely innocent RA caught up in the CID witch 
hunt.  A highly-decorated combat veteran of Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq, 
then-Captain John Suprynowicz worked on the side as an RA in the G-RAP 
from 2006 to 2011.47  At the urging of his superiors to participate in the G-
RAP in order to assist in filling the ranks of the National Guard, 
Suprynowicz took the short online DOCUPAK course and was immediately 
qualified as a DOCUPAK RA.  Over the course of a five-year period, the 
former Army sniper worked diligently in accordance with the G-RAP rules 
to reach out to numerous PSs, earning what amounted to about $17,000 per 
year for his efforts. 
Then in 2013, while assigned to U.S. Army North in San Antonio, Texas, 
Department of Justice (DOJ) and CID agents confronted 
Major Suprynowicz at his workplace, ensuring that the Chief of Staff (COS) 
at U.S. Army North and all in his chain of command were aware that 
Major Suprynowicz was going to be “arrested” for committing fraud in the 
G-RAP.  Although Major Suprynowicz stressed that he had done nothing 
illegal in G-RAP, DOJ and CID agents confronted him and encouraged him 
to “confess to his crimes” in order to avoid going to jail.  No arrest was 
 
46. Testimony of Philip Crane at 111–12, Colorado v. Wilson, No. 14CR327 (C.D. Col. 2015). 
47. Gen. Officer Memorandum of Reprimand from Major Gen. Clarence Chinn to Major John 
W. Suprynowicz (Aug. 31, 2016) (on file with the Warrior Defense Project, St. Mary’s University School 
of Law, San Antonio, Texas); but see Scarborough, supra note 8 (“In 2006, [Major Suprynowicz] received 
$4,000.  The next year, $49,000.  By 2010, his last year as an RA, he had collected $85,000 for 41 recruits, 
making him one of the highest-paid RAs in the program’s short history.”). 
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made, and Major Suprynowicz along with his chain of command assumed 
that the matter was closed. 
A year later, with a new COS and chain of command at U.S. Army North 
in place, DOJ/CID sent Major Suprynowicz a “Target Letter” threatening 
prosecution in a federal district court.  Facing threats of federal prison, 
Major Suprynowicz hired a civilian attorney and paid a hefty “retainer” fee.  
Still, no action was taken against him throughout all of 2014 and the first 
eleven months of 2015. 
By 2015, the federal statute of limitations for his involvement in the G-
RAP had tolled, and Major Suprynowicz had changed commands to U.S. 
Army South, also located in San Antonio, Texas.  Reflecting his sterling 
work ethic and abilities, in December 2015, Major Suprynowicz was 
selected below the zone for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.  
Family and friends celebrated this positive accomplishment, not realizing 
that the CID nightmare would soon return. 
In January 2016, while serving as the senior Action Officer (AO) lead for 
the Central American (CENTAM) Regional Leaders Conference (RLC) and 
the Army National Guard Adjutant Generals (TAG) conference, 
Major Suprynowicz’s top-secret security clearance was abruptly pulled.  He 
was assigned to a desk job, notified that his promotion to 
Lieutenant Colonel was in abeyance, and denied any opportunity to 
compete for Battalion Command slots as a career advancement.  After 
three years of “investigating,” the CID had produced an ROI against him.  
The guilty until innocent onslaught had spun into full gear.  
Major Suprynowicz sought legal representation from the pro bono legal 
assistance mission at St. Mary’s University School of Law, in San Antonio, 
Texas.  Now known as the Warrior Defense Project (WDP), the center’s 
Director, Professor of Law Jeffery Addicott, had served on active duty for 
twenty years as an Army Judge Advocate.  The WDP agreed to represent 
Major Suprynowicz. 
After meeting face-to-face with a team of CID and FBI agents and 
chastising them for producing the absurdly phony ROI, it was quickly 
apparent that no criminal charges would be levied against 
Major Suprynowicz by the DOJ or under the Uniformed Code of Military 
Justice (UCMJ).  This left only the possibility of military administrative 
punishment such as a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand 
(GOMR), which can nevertheless easily end a soldier’s career and lead to an 
involuntary release from the National Guard.  Indeed, on June 28, 2016, 
Major Suprynowicz was issued a formal GOMR by his commanding 
13
Addicott: The Army’s G-RAP Fiasco
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2019
  
562 ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:549 
general, Major General Clarence Chinn, Commander, U.S. Army South.48  
This GOMR was accompanied by a two-inch thick CID ROI alleging that 
“probable cause exists to believe [Major] Suprynowicz committed the 
offenses of Wire Fraud and Aggravated Identify Theft”49 by submitting 
names of PSs for payment that he had never met.  Amazingly, the ROI did 
not contain a single “sworn statement” from a single witness or PS 
implicating Major Suprynowicz in any wrongdoing, only the typed-up notes 
of CID agents reflecting telephone conversations they had engaged in with 
certain individuals who were cited in the CID notes as not knowing then-
Captain Suprynowicz, even though DOCUPAK records showed that 
Suprynowicz had submitted the names of these individuals for payment 
after talking to them about joining the National Guard. 
While the CID ROI took almost three years to complete, 
Major Suprynowicz was given only forty-five days to gather evidence and 
rebut the GOMR.  During that brief time frame, the WDP was able to track 
down, interview, and then obtain five sworn written affidavits from former 
PSs regarding the key and bottom-line element of the alleged misconduct 
cited in the GOMR—that these individuals did not know, or had never met, 
or talked to Suprynowicz about entering military service.  All individuals 
swore that the CID notes were grossly inaccurate and that to the contrary 
of what the ROI purported, that they knew then-Captain Suprynowicz in 
the context of joining the National Guard.  Indeed, given more time, each 
and every one of the so-called witnesses cited in the CID ROI would 
provide a contradictory statement as to what the CID telephone interviewer 
recorded in the CID ROI.  In addition, all former PSs said that the CID 
interviewer never read back their statement over the phone for them to 
confirm and validate as an accurate rendition of their words.  It was blatantly 
obvious that the CID telephone interviews grossly twisted and recklessly 
misrepresented the facts. 
On the one hand, Major General Chinn possessed a CID ROI that clearly 
indicated, by means of telephone interviews, that certain PSs did not know 
then-Captain Suprynowicz.  Yet, the sworn statements obtained by the 
defense showed that not only did they know Suprynowicz, but in many 
instances knew him very well.  Something was seriously amiss. 
 
 48. Gen. Officer Memorandum of Reprimand from Major Gen. Clarence Chinn to Major John 
Suprynowicz (June 28, 2016) (on file with the Warrior Defense Project, St. Mary’s University School 
of Law, San Antonio, Texas). 
49. Id. 
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Faced with a clear contradiction between the CID ROI and the defense’s 
evidence, Major General Chinn rescinded the GOMR,50 and ordered an 
independent officer (IO) to conduct a “Commanders Inquiry (CI),” and to 
base the inquiry on actual sworn testimony from witnesses, something the 
CID ROI had not done.  It quickly became apparent that of the 
eighteen witnesses interviewed by the IO, all had some degree of 
recollection of then-Captain Suprynowicz in the context of their decision to 
join the Army National Guard.  However, some of the former PSs could 
not recall giving Captain Suprynowicz their PII. 
Major General Chinn elected to issue a second GOMR on August 31, 
2016, with new allegations that while Major Suprynowicz had met with all 
the individuals he had submitted to DOCUPAK for payment, he had in 
some instances improperly obtained PII from some of the PSs.  This second 
GOMR was also vigorously contested by the WDP in subsequent lengthy 
and extensive rebuttal legal memorandums.51  In many ways, the second 
GOMR was far more insidious than the first GOMR since it was entirely 
based on ex post facto considerations having absolutely nothing to do with 
the actual G-RAP rules pertaining to the acquisition or use of PII. 
The second GOMR alleged two specific acts of misconduct on the part 
of Major Suprynowicz, to wit: 
•  An investigation [The Commander’s Inquiry – Memorandum of 
Findings dated 26 August 2016] reveals that many individuals 
[Potential Soldiers] you claimed under G-RAP did not provide you 
with their PII” and 
•  Others [Potential Soldiers] did not consent to you using their PII 
for the purposes of G-RAP.52 
Of course, the key to determining whether or not then-
Captain Suprynowicz violated the two areas of concern specifically cited in 
 
 50. Withdrawal of Gen. Officer Memorandum of Reprimand from Major Gen. Clarence Chinn 
(Aug. 31, 2016) (on file with the Warrior Defense Project, St. Mary’s University School of Law, San 
Antonio, Texas). 
51. See Memorandum to Major Gen. Clarence Chinn (Sept. 27, 2016) (on file with the Warrior 
Defense Project, St. Mary’s University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas); Memorandum to 
Major Gen. Clarence Chinn (Oct. 8, 2016) (on file with the Warrior Defense Project, St. Mary’s 
University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas). 
52. Gen. Officer Memorandum of Reprimand from Major Gen. Clarence Chinn to Major John 
W. Suprynowicz, supra note 47. 
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the GOMR, could only be determined in the actual requirements for the RA 
under the G-RAP rules at the time of the conduct in question.  In other 
words, as an RA in the program, what did the G-RAP rules require of 
Major Suprynowicz in terms of: (1) obtaining PII from Potential Soldiers; 
and (2) obtaining consent from the Potential Soldier for use of that PII in 
the G-RAP system? 
The first of the two allegations of wrongdoing set out in the second 
GOMR was that Suprynowicz did not get the PII directly from each PS he 
talked to and, by implication, from no other source.  This first allegation of 
wrongdoing was in direct conflict with the G-RAP rules instructing the RA 
on how he could obtain PII.  In short, there was no G-RAP rule at the time 
that required Major Suprynowicz to obtain all or even partial PII by or from 
the PS.  In short, although the G-RAP rules did require that the RA obtain 
the necessary PII of the PS in order for DOCUPAK to then enter that PS 
into the G-RAP system, it did not require that the RA be provided that 
information from the PS.  In fact, the G-RAP rules stated the exact opposite 
in terms of how the RA could obtain PII regarding a particular PS should 
they not be able to get all the PII during their conversation with the PS.  The 
G-RAP rules in force at the time specifically stated that any missing or 
additional PII that the RA might need in order to enter the PS system via 
computer could be obtained by the RA from the “local RRNCO.”53  
Obviously, Suprynowicz had some bare base level of PII from each and 
every PS, i.e., their name and some contact information, or he would not be 
engaged in a conversation with the PS.  Since all of the witnesses confirmed 
that they spoke to then-Captain Suprynowicz, this is simply not an issue.  
Again, and most critically important, the G-RAP rules do not require that 
all—or even some—of the PII be obtained from the individual PS as alleged 
 
53. G-RAP Overview, supra note 21, at 7.  There were multiple versions of the G-RAP rules 
during the seven years of its existence.  According to Agent Julie Thurlow’s statement, rules version 
2.0 would have taken effect in November 2007.  Agent’s Investigation Report from Special Agent Julie 
Thurlow 1 (Nov. 22, 2013) (on file with the Warrior Defense Project, St. Mary’s University School of 
Law, San Antonio, Texas).  The biggest change between version 1.5 and 2.0 is handling of PII.  See id. 
at 4 (noting the update in G-RAP rules “[r]egarding what information the RA needed to get from the 
Potential Soldier and from where, the RA’s G-RAP account informed them of the information required 
to make a valid nomination[.]”).  Additionally, it wasn’t until three years later that the National Guard 
Bureau even issued a memo regarding handling of PII through G-RAP.  Memorandum from Ronald 
S. Walls Explaining Guidelines for Recruiting and Retention Personnel (May 4, 2010) (on file with the 
Warrior Defense Project, St. Mary’s University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas).  However, neither 
DOCUPAK nor the government has ever produced any evidence confirming that these rule changes 
were sent to the DOCUPAK RAs.  There was also no mechanism to prove that anyone saw the 
May 2010 memo regarding PII.  Id. 
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as the first point of wrongdoing in the GOMR.  The G-RAP rules on page 7 
clearly state in response to the hypothetical RA’s question about “where do 
I [RA] get it [PII from the Potential Soldier]?” that the RA need not get all 
the necessary PII to enter into the computer from the PS.54  In short, the 
RA is instructed to obtain PII for the PS directly from the “local RRNCO.”  
Page 7 states in full: 
What information do I [the recruiting assistant] need to get from the 
Potential Soldier and where do I get it [PII]? 
The online training will inform you of all required information and supporting 
documentation to effect enlistment.  Your local RRNCO [Army Recruiter] 
will provide specifics for each case [the PS].  Legal Name (Birth Certificate); 
Address; Social Security Number (SSN Card); Date of Birth (Birth Certificate); 
Citizenship (Birth Certificate); Dependency Status (Marriage Certificate); Law 
Violations and Physical Status are key elements of the pre-qualification 
process.55 
The second allegation in the GOMR, that some PSs “did not consent to 
you [Suprynowicz] using their PII for the purposes of G-RAP,”56 is also ex 
post facto in nature.  Again, in hindsight, this would have been an excellent 
program metric which one might expect to be found in the G-RAP rules, 
but the fact is that it is not found in the G-RAP rules.  First, there is no 
written consent form for the affirmative release of PII provided in the G-
RAP rules for the RA to use.  Second, no RA is ever instructed in the G-
RAP rules to create such a consent form.  While this would seem like a 
reasonable requirement, which could also memorialize the conversations 
between the RA and the PS (now in most cases done over ten years ago), it 
did not exist in the G-RAP rules and was not required by G-RAP rules.  
Third, there is no requirement in the G-RAP rules that the RA specifically 
obtain actual verbal or written consent from the PS. 
In fact, the only required consent that the RA had to obtain was if the RA 
intended to use the PII for any other purpose other than G-RAP.  Thus, 
since Suprynowicz never used the PII for any other purpose other than 
entering the PS into the G-RAP computer system as required, Suprynowicz 
was not required to obtain consent.  The pertinent language on page 7 of 
 
54. G-RAP Overview, supra note 21, at 7. 
55. Id. 
56. Gen. Officer Memorandum of Reprimand from Major Gen. Clarence Chinn to Major John 
W. Suprynowicz, supra note 47. 
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the G-RAP rules clearly states when consent must be obtained, and that 
being written consent: 
Further release [of PII] without written consent by the Potential Soldier is 
strictly prohibited.57 
Although the actual requirements of the G-RAP rules absolutely 
exonerated Major Suprynowicz from the two statements of alleged 
wrongdoing contained in the second GOMR—G-RAP rules did not require 
that the RA get the PII from the PS or obtain consent to enter the PII into 
the G-RAP—two other questions were also asked in the IO Report.  While 
the second GOMR did not include these two additional questions as a point 
of wrongdoing, the defense also responded to them as they reflected the 
confusion of what G-RAP was supposed to do and what it was required to 
do.  The final two IO questions were: 
[D]id MAJ Suprynowicz influence their [the Potential Soldier] decision to join 
the National Guard? 
[D]id MAJ Suprynowicz mentor the witness [the Potential Soldier] until 
he/she shipped to basic training or became fully integrated into his/her 
unit.58 
The first portion of this analysis once again required reference to the G-
RAP rules regarding the role of the RA in influencing the PS and then 
providing mentorship to the PS.  The required G-RAP rules provided 
extremely limited guidance for the RA, setting a very low bar of expectation 
set out in vague and aspirational language only.  The entire G-RAP rules in 
this regard are found on pages 7, 10, and 11, respectively.59  Page 7 provides 
the following: 
What can I say/not say to people about joining the ARNG? 
You should start by sharing your personal experiences with the Potential 
Soldier as they relate to your knowledge of the ARNG.  You will speak from 
authority when telling your own story.  It is helpful to ask the Potential Soldier 
 
57. G-RAP Overview, supra note 21, at 7. 
58. Memorandum of Findings from Colonel Scott P. Nolan, Investigating Officer, to 
Colonel James E. Dodson, at 6 (Aug. 26, 2016) [hereinafter Memorandum of Findings] (on file with 
the Warrior Defense Project, St. Mary’s University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas). 
59. G-RAP Overview, supra note 21, at 7–11. 
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probing questions to determine their individual needs, wants and desires.  You 
should only provide factual information to Potential Soldiers, and tell them 
you are unsure if you do not know the answer.  The RRNCO should be able 
to provide further insight at the meeting engagement.  You are not authorized 
to make guarantees or promises to a Potential Soldier in regard to any benefits 
or incentives.  RRNCOs and MEPS Guidance Counselors are the only 
authorized personnel to make commitments on behalf of the Guard.60 
Page 10 provides the following suggested guidance, employing “should” 
instead of “must:” 
What should I do with the new recruit while they are at Basic Training 
and AIT? 
You should support your new Soldier from afar by writing letters, e-mails and 
postcards.  Additionally, you should engage the new Soldier’s family back 
home when appropriate.61 
Page 11 provides the following: 
At what point do I no longer work with the Potential Soldier? 
Your responsibilities end upon receipt of your final $1,000 payment.  
However, you are encouraged to maintain a positive relationship with all of 
your new Soldiers and to cultivate potential nominees from within their 
spheres of influence.62 
In light of the G-RAP rules and the gathered witness statements 
associated with the case of Major Suprynowicz, the following conclusions 
could be reasonably drawn, giving rest to the last two questions in the IO 
Report: 
(1) Did the IO witnesses confirm knowing Major (P) Suprynowicz? 
Yes—18 of 18 witnesses confirm knowing Major (P) Suprynowicz.63 
 
60. Id. at 10. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 11. 
 63. See Memorandum of Findings, supra note 58, at 5–6 (summarizing the findings of the 
eighteen witnesses that met with Major Suprynowicz). 
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(2) Did the IO witnesses confirm discussing the military as a Potential Soldier 
with Major Suprynowicz? 
Yes—18 of 18 witnesses confirm discussing the military with Major (P) 
Suprynowicz to some degree.64 
(3) Did Major Suprynowicz “influence their decision to join the National 
Guard?” 
Not relevant—there is nothing in the G-RAP rules that required 
Suprynowicz to be the sole source of influence for the PS’s decision to join 
the National Guard as question 3 of the IO Report erroneously asked.  The 
G-RAP rules put no quantitative measure on how much or how long the 
RA conversations had to be.  The degree of influence that Major 
Suprynowicz had on any given PS is not a metric of the G-RAP—the G-
RAP rules do not require this measure of achievement.  In turn, neither 
Major Suprynowicz nor any RA is expected to be a “mind reader” to 
determine the exact impact of his discussions with the PS’s decision to join 
the Army National Guard.  Indeed, viewing the matter the other way, not 
one of the PSs informed Major Suprynowicz verbally or in writing that they 
had already made up their mind to join the military and that his 
conversations with them had no impact on them.  This subjective attitude 
may or may not have been in their minds at the time of their conversations 
with Major Suprynowicz, but it is irrelevant.  Per G-RAP Basic Instructions 
document page 5, “[a]nyone in your ‘[s]phere of [i]nfluence’ expressing an 
interest in the ARNG with whom you have a personal relationship” can be 
nominated.65  
Still, in the majority of cases, then-Captain Suprynowicz went far beyond 
the guidance of the G-RAP rules and normal expectations to mentor the 
vast majority of the PSs he worked with.  In fact, the IO generally 
characterized Suprynowicz in this process as: “inspirational leader,” and 
“influential.”66 
Finally, the implication that because Major Suprynowicz applied to 
DOCUPAK for money he earned under the provisions of G-RAP he was 
 
 64. See id. at 2–4 (summarizing each witnesses interaction with Major Suprynowicz). 
65. Guard Recruiting Assistance Program PowerPoint, DEFEND OUR PROTECTORS, 
http://www.defendourprotectors.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/GRAP-PPT.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A45U-4DPG]. 
66. Memorandum of Findings, supra note 58, at 6. 
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somehow required to inform the PS of this fact is fallacious.  Under the G-
RAP rules, no RA was required to inform any of the PSs that their individual 
efforts under G-RAP might be monetarily rewarded. 
At the end of the day, when faced with the facts of the G-RAP rules, the 
real issue for gauging wrongdoing for any given RA is whether the RA met 
with the PS.  Indeed, there is no doubt that some RAs were guilty of 
wrongdoing and criminality because they never met with the PS at all and 
yet entered that PS’s name into the DOCUPAK system, usually in a kick-
back scheme to split the money with a recruiter.  This scenario of 
wrongdoing and criminality never applied to Suprynowicz.  Ironically, the 
facts are that Suprynowicz personally knew and met with all of the PSs about 
joining the Army National Guard as required by G-RAP rules.  
Nevertheless, his reward was to suffer through a four-year slanderous 
campaign to destroy his reputation and military career.  The truth is that 
Major Suprynowicz followed and complied with all the G-RAP rules in 
terms of obtaining PII and consent issues when entering that information 
into the DOCUPAK system.  Any money he obtained was lawfully worked 
for and earned in accordance with the provisions of the G-RAP rules. 
Major General Chinn considered the legal and rational arguments in the 
defense rebuttal and immediately rescinded the second GOMR.67  
Furthermore, Major General Chinn specifically found Major Suprynowicz 
innocent of any wrongdoing and ordered that the military “flag,” which put 
all favorable action in abeyance, be lifted immediately.68  By this time, it was 
evident to any reasonable mind that the initial CID ROI investigation, which 
had lasted three years, was an affront to basic values of due process and 
fairness.  While all CID investigations carry the usual weight of stress and 
uncertainty to the accused, taking three years to investigate what should 
have taken three months (at most) is unfathomable.  It leads to the obvious 
conclusion that something within the CID system is seriously amiss.  
Considering the high-profile fiasco of G-RAP, which touched the highest 
levels of the Army command structure, the answer must certainly rest, in 
part, to a relentless pressure on Army CID to get results—regardless of the 
 
 67. See Filing Determination on General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand from 
Major Gen. Clarence Chinn for Major John Suprynowicz (Nov. 23, 2016) (on file with the Warrior 
Defense Project, St. Mary’s University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas) (directing the reprimand 
be withdrawn and destroyed). 
 68. Memorandum from Major Gen. Clarence Chinn withdrawing Gen. Officer Memorandum 
of Reprimand of Major Suprynowicz (Jul. 5, 2017) [hereinafter Withdrawal of Second GOMR] (on file 
with the Warrior Defense Project, St. Mary’s University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas). 
21
Addicott: The Army’s G-RAP Fiasco
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2019
  
570 ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:549 
means or consequences.  This extreme zealousness engulfed many 
innocents, like Major Suprynowicz. 
D. CID’s “Titling” System 
In the normal course of events within the Army military justice system, 
once a suspected crime has occurred, the CID will conduct an investigation 
to gather evidence associated with the alleged crime and to identify a 
suspect(s) that might have committed the offense(s).  This process can 
culminate in a written formal ROI.  The CID ROI will then go to the 
servicing Judge Advocate for a legal opinion to affirm the ROI’s conclusion 
that enough evidence has been gathered to conclude that there is probable 
cause to believe that a particular suspect has committed a crime.  If the Judge 
Advocate concurs, then the suspect is automatically “titled” by the CID in 
their system of records.  In the vast majority of the G-RAP cases, the 
servicing Judge Advocate provided great weight to the assertions and 
conclusions contained in the ROI under the assumption that the agents 
performed their investigative jobs in accordance with law and policy.  
Further, the ROI is taken at face value as the legal office does not have the 
assets to “double check the math” for accuracy of what is in the CID ROI.  
In short, once a suspect is “titled,” he remains in the CID system—which 
is freely accessed by fellow agencies in and out of the military—regardless 
of if that individual is later fully exonerated by proper judicial or 
administrative bodies. 
Accordingly, going back to the illustration from the case of 
Major Suprynowicz, even though his command rejected the CID ROI and 
exonerated him, his struggle for justice was far from over.  Due to the CID’s 
practice of storing in a system of records all those individuals that are 
“titled” in a CID ROI,69 Major Suprynowicz was notified that his 
promotion to Lieutenant Colonel announced in 2016 could not go forward, 
regardless of the findings of innocence by his commander, 
Major General Chinn.70  Because Major Suprynowicz remained in the CID 
title system, his case must now be referred to a Promotion Review Board 
(PRB) and he would have to submit rebuttal materials all over again to prove 
his innocence.  The PRB would consider the defense rebuttal written 
 
69. See Patricia A. Ham, The CID Titling Process—Founded or Unfounded, 1998 ARMY L. 1, 1 (1998) 
(“Titling is the decision to place the name of a person or other entity in the ‘subject’ block of a CID 
report of investigation.”). 
70. Withdrawal of Second GOMR, supra note 68. 
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materials and the unfavorable CID ROI and, in turn, make a 
recommendation to the Secretary of the Army for a final decision.  The 
WDP assisted Major Suprynowicz in this process as well.  It then took 
another year to play out before the Secretary of the Army, Mark T. Esper, 
issued a favorable memorandum on October 29, 2018 stating, “Effective 
immediately, I retain Major John W. Suprynowicz on the FY17 
LTC . . . recommended promotion list, pursuant to Army Regulation 135-
155, paragraph 4-11.”71 
As illustrated by the Suprynowicz case, all those innocents that are 
improperly “titled” by the CID face similar hurdles in their subsequent 
military career progression ranging from promotions, holding security 
clearances, and filling choice job assignments.  All while the soldier sits in 
limbo for years trying to clear his name.  Indeed, negative ramifications 
bleed over into the National Guard soldier’s civilian job as well.  Examples 
of cases handled by the WDP include a Tennessee National Guard military 
police soldier who was automatically denied a State license to carry a 
concealed weapon72 and a National Guard officer in South Carolina who 
was fired from his civilian police officer position solely because his name 
popped up on a background check that he was “titled” by the CID.73  Both 
of these soldiers have been exonerated by their respective commands of the 
CID accusations that they engaged in criminality in G-RAP, but because 
they were “titled,” their respective States took adverse action against them. 
Although the CID has an administrative procedure for a soldier to request 
that he be deleted from the CID “title” system of records, it is an internal 
decision made by and within the CID itself and is rarely ever granted.  There 
is no independent oversight.74  It is truly a case of the fox guarding the 
henhouse. 
 
71. See Memorandum for Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1 from Mark T. Esper, Secretary of the 
Army (Oct. 29, 2018) (on file with the Warrior Defense Project, St. Mary’s University School of Law, 
San Antonio, Texas) (recommending the promotion of Major Suprynowicz).  Major Suprynowicz was 
actually promoted while assigned at the Pentagon in early 2020. 
72. Letter from Lisa Knight, Director of Handgun Program, Dept. of Safety and Homeland 
Sec., Tenn., to Kristin Steakley (Apr. 17, 2015) (on file with the Warrior Defense Project, St. Mary’s 
University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas). 
73. Memorandum from Major Irick A. Geary Jr., Division of Law Enf’t and Safety, Univ. of 
S.C., to Benjamin Sternemann (Mar. 28, 2019) (on file with the Warrior Defense Project, St. Mary’s 
University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas). 
74. Ham, supra note 69, at 15. 
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In January 2020, the Director of the newly-formed Congressional Justice 
for Warriors Caucus (CJWC)75 requested that the WDP produce a “white 
paper” on the matter of the CID title system and how it can act to harm 
innocent members of the armed forces who have been exonerated of 
wrongdoing.  The WDP paper provided was entitled: “The Army’s Criminal 
Investigation Command, Criminal Investigation Division (CID) Use of an 
Administrative Identification System of Records called ‘Titling’ of 
Individuals Suspected of UCMJ Criminal Activity.”76  The WDP paper 
urged Congress “[t]o develop a legal/policy methodology to address those 
cases where an individual is ‘titled’ by the CID but later found innocent of 
the alleged UCMJ violation(s), is expeditiously withdrawn from the CID 
‘title’ system of records.”77 
III.    THE WSLA AND G-RAP 
A final point of concern in alleging criminality in the G-RAP and AR-RAP 
is the matter of the government’s ability to bypass the statute of limitations.  
Since federal law prohibits prosecuting a crime after the tolling of the 
associated statute of limitations, criminal investigations are also abated.78  For 
fraud, the time limit is five years, which would automatically disqualify the vast 
majority of the investigations undertaken by the CID in G-RAP and AR-RAP 
cases.  As of April 2014, a total of thirty-five individuals were convicted in 
federal court, twenty-one of those from Texas.79 
With the use of unprecedented numbers of civilian contractors on the 
battlefield to support the efforts of the military in the GWOT, Congress 
expressed its concern that cases of fraud might go unpunished unless the 
statute of limitations was waived.  Because the longstanding WSLA80 only 
applied to conflicts where Congress had made a formal declaration of war 
 
75. The Congressional Justice for Warriors Caucus (CJWC) is “dedicated to educating Members 
of Congress about combat-related incidents where U.S. service members who are fighting for our 
freedoms have been unjustly incarcerated under the UCMJ.”  Congressional Justice for Warriors Caucus, 
GOVSERV, https://www.govserv.org/US/Washington-D.C./474951293314603/Congressional-
Justice-for-Warriors-Caucus [https://perma.cc/8DDT-FZLA]. 
76. Jeffrey F. Addicott, The Army’s Criminal Investigation Command, Criminal Investigation 
Division (CID) Use of an Administrative Identification System of Records Called “Titling” of 
Individuals Suspected of UCMJ Criminal Activity (on file with the Warrior Defense Project, St. Mary’s 
University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas). 
77. Id. 
78. Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (1948). 
79. NGA G-RAP REPORT, supra note 9, at 4. 
80. 18 U.S.C. § 3287. 
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under its Article I powers, in 2008 Congress passed the Wartime Enforcement 
of Fraud Act (WEFA) which amended the WSLA so that it would now apply 
to conflicts where Congress had passed an authorization for use of military 
force.81  During the GWOT, Congress passed two such authorizations.  
Congress specifically authorized the use of military force by enacting, 
respectively, the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)82 
and the 2003 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq 
Resolution (AUMFAI).83  The AUMF limits the authorized use of military 
force to “those nations, organizations, or persons [the President] determines 
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks which 
occurred on September 11, 2001.”84  The AUMFAI, authorized the 
President to: 
[U]se the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary 
and appropriate in order to: 
(1)  defend the national security of the United States against the continuing 
threat posed by Iraq; and 
(2)  enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding 
Iraq.85 
For the soldiers who also served as “contractors” in the G-RAP and AR-
RAP cases, the WEFA raises several critical legal issues pertaining to its 
applicability to soldiers who served as contractors and to the issue of the 
location of the “battlefield.”  In 2019, by a writ of certiorari, the United States 
Supreme Court was asked to take up the matter in the case of United States v. 
Jucutan.86  In 2015, Jordan M. Jucutan, a member of the Army Reserve in the 
Northern Mariana Islands, was charged with AR-RAP related offenses, 
which were allegedly committed between 2005 and 2009.87  The charges—
 
81. S. REP. NO. 110-431, at 1 (2008). 
82. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
83. Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002). 
84. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
85. Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002). 
86. United States v. Jucutan, 756 F. App’x 691 (9th Cir. 2018). 
87. United States v. Jucutan, No. 1:15-CR-00017, 2016 WL 3063852, at *1 (N. Mar. I. May 26, 
2016). 
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wire fraud88 and aggravated identity theft89—were brought well past the 
five-year statute of limitations for most federal crimes and should have been 
barred.90  The government asserted that the five-year statute of limitations 
period, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a), had been suspended by the WSLA.  
Jucutan appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss for 
prosecution of acts beyond the set statute of limitations and lack of standing 
to prosecute due to lack of any alleged criminal acts committed against the 
United States of America.91  The district court concluded that the criminal 
indictment against Mr. Jucutan was not barred by the generally applicable 
five-years statute of limitations period,92 finding that the WSLA tolled 
18 U.S.C. § 3282(a), and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial, 
by a 2-1 vote.93 
Agreeing that both lower courts in Jucutan erred in concluding that the 
WSLA applied to the wire fraud and aggravated identity theft charged 
against Mr. Jucutan, the WDP filed an amicus brief on behalf of Mr. Jucutan’s 
writ of certiorari.94  Unfortunately, even though there existed a split in 
decisions about the legality of tolling the statute of limitations in two circuit 
courts, the Supreme Court refused to take up the matter, leaving it to Congress 
to pass corrective legislation. 
A. The History of the WSLA and WEFA 
In 1942, during World War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed 
into law the WSLA, tolling the statute of limitations and providing 
prosecutors more time to bring charges “relating to criminal fraud offenses 
in the United States”95 by civilian contractors.  In 1948, President Harry S. 
Truman signed a new law making the WSLA permanent.96  The WSLA, 
however, only applied to a formal congressional declaration of war under 
Article I. 
 
88. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2017). 
89. Id. § 1028A. 
90. See id. § 3282(a) (“Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, no person shall be 
prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital, unless the indictment is found or the 
information is instituted within five years next after such offense shall have been committed.”). 
91. See Jucutan, 756 F. App’x at 692 (denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss). 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. Brief for Jordan M. Jucutan as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Jucutan v. United States, 
139 S. Ct. 2656 (2019) (No. 18-8956), 2019 WL 2226021. 
95. S. REP. NO. 110-431, at 2 (2008). 
96. Id. 
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As noted, in the GWOT there was no such formal declaration of war by 
Congress.  The WEFA amended97 the WSLA, so its tolling clause would 
apply to a congressional authorization of military force pursuant to the War 
Powers Resolution.98  A report from the Committee on the Judiciary, 
providing the purpose of the WEFA, specified that the original WSLA was 
signed in “[recognition of] the extreme difficulty in tracking down 
contracting fraud in the midst of a war . . . .”99  Still, at no point does the 
report stipulate a deviation from the original purpose of the WSLA.100  In 
summary, the WSLA, as amended, applies to fraud against the United States 
in “[relation] to the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan,”101 not to 
performing purely support functions which have no direct nexus to combat 
activities. 
B. Use of Contractors on the Battlefield 
The level of civilian contractor activities in concert with Department of 
Defense (DOD) missions—encompassing a range of technical, logistical, 
maintenance, and security support services—has caused a “substantial shift 
in the types of contracts for troop support services.”102  Without the 
extensive use of contractors, the American military could not conduct 
combat operations, contingency operations, or even peacetime 
operations.103 
Indeed, given the scope and pace of the modern military, military planners 
no longer consider civilian contractors as a luxury or a “nice to have” 
addition to the force structure.  Because civilian contractors now provide a 
wide range of essential support to DOD missions, American military 
superiority requires contractor support to maintain military readiness and 
 
97. See id. at 6 (“The [WSLA] . . . would close a loophole in current law and give the government 
new power to prosecute contracting fraud in Iraq and Afghanistan.”). 
98. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (2017) (outlining the steps Congress must take to authorize the lawful 
use of military force by the Executive in a prolonged military engagement lasting more than sixty days). 
99. S. REP. NO. 110-431, at 2 (2008). 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. See VALERIE BAILEY GRASSO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. RL33834, DEFENSE 
CONTRACTING IN IRAQ: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS, at ii (2008) (discussing the various 
types of Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contracts that have been awarded); Jeffrey 
F. Addicott, Contractors on the “Battlefield:” Providing Adequate Protection, Anti-Terrorism Training, and Personnel 
Recovery for Civilian Contractors Accompanying the Military in Combat and Contingency Operations, 28 HOUS. J. 
INT’L L. 323, 358 (2006) (“DOD guidance regarding the provision of basic AT training has not kept 
up with the volume of contractors pouring into Iraq and other places around the globe.”). 
103. See 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(13) (2017) (defining “contingency operation”). 
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operational capabilities.104  As such, civilian contractors are critical to 
national security in and out of armed-conflict scenarios.  In turn, as 
evidenced by the Army’s ill-conceived contract with DOCUPAK, certain 
contractors were simultaneously serving as military personnel, albeit 
complying with requirements attempting to separate their status as soldiers 
and contractors performing work for DOCUPAK. 
Because Mr. Jucutan was employed by DOCUPAK as a contractor and 
performed his contract requirements under AR-RAP outside of the scope 
of any wartime activity, he should not have been subjected to the tolling 
provisions of the WSLA.  Further, the military provided limited guidance on 
how DOCUPAK established and administered the subject contract, making 
that relationship beyond the intent of the legislation.  
The GWOT is unlikely to end soon.  In Boumediene v. Bush,105 the Supreme 
Court said the GWOT may not end for “a generation or more.”106  Without 
an end to the GWOT, the WSLA has the unintended consequence of 
creating a potentially unlimited statute of limitations for contractors.  This 
means contractors could remain subject to potential liability for criminal 
offenses for years, possibly a lifetime.  Consequently, the potential for 
prolonged liability will prevent otherwise willing contractors from assisting 
the military in completing its mission, hindering U.S. military capabilities 
and national security. 
The repeated position of the Court is that the WSLA “should be ‘narrowly 
construed’ and ‘interpreted in favor of repose.’”107  Given that the 
government has had more than ten years to indict Mr. Jucutan, a “statute of 
limitations reflects a legislative judgment that, after a certain time, no 
quantum of evidence is sufficient to convict.”108  According to the 
Tenth Circuit, quoting the Supreme Court, the time limit barring a criminal 
charge is: 
[D]esigned to protect individuals from having to defend themselves against 
charges when the basic facts may have become obscured by the passage of 
time and to minimize the danger of official punishment because of acts in the 
 
104. JEFFREY F. ADDICOTT, TERRORISM LAW: MATERIALS, CASES, COMMENTS 286 (7th ed. 
2014). 
105. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
106. Id. at 785. 
107. Kellogg Brown v. United States ex rel. Carter, 135 S. Ct. 1970, 1978 (2015) (quoting Bridges 
v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 216 (1953)). 
108. United States v. DeLia, 906 F.3d 1212, 1217 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting Stogner v. California, 
539 U.S. 607, 615 (2003)). 
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far-distant past.  Statutes of limitations also encourage law enforcement to 
promptly investigate suspected criminal activity.109 
As stated, the original version of the WSLA was enacted “to ensure that 
the fog of war does not allow those who defraud the United States from 
getting away with it because their actions could not be investigated during 
hostilities.”110  Regardless, however, the WSLA “creates an exception to a 
longstanding congressional ‘policy of repose’ that is fundamental to our 
society and our criminal law.”111  Accordingly, any ambiguity in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3287 should be strictly construed and “interpreted in favor of repose.”112 
C. Repose 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision to uphold the tolling provisions violates the 
Supreme Court’s longstanding principle of repose.  Providing an extended—
potentially indefinite—statute of limitations for a criminal offense is contrary 
to the Court’s precedent.  In Toussie v. United States,113 the Court held: 
The purpose of a statute of limitations is to limit exposure to criminal 
prosecution to a certain fixed period of time following the occurrence of those 
acts the legislature has decided to punish by criminal sanctions.  Such a 
limitation is designed to protect individuals from having to defend themselves 
against charges when the basic facts may have become obscured by the 
passage of time and to minimize the danger of official punishment because of 
acts in the far-distant past.114 
The charged offenses against Mr. Jucutan are precisely of the same kind 
Toussie finds problematic.  Indeed, if the statute of limitations is to be tolled, 
the alleged offenses must be directly related to wartime activities.  In turn, 
although the WEFA extended the statute of limitations to the overseas 
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the WEFA did not broaden WSLA’s scope 
beyond the type of charged offenses it would toll during wartime.  
Specifically, the report from the Committee on the Judiciary states that the 
WSLA “is not intended to apply to . . . military actions not specifically 
 
109. Id. (quoting Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114–15 (1970)). 
110. United States v. Sack, 125 F. Supp. 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); S. REP. NO. 110-431, at 3 n.4 
(2008). 
111. DeLia, 906 F.3d at 1217. 
112. Id. 
113. Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112 (1970). 
114. Id. at 114–15. 
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authorized by Congress pursuant to the War Powers Resolution.”115  Thus, 
the WSLA only applies to fraud against the United States, which is 
connected to the specifically authorized use of military force, which must be 
directly tied to those activities in the overseas war zones outside of the 
continental United States. 
Both congressional authorizations of military force limit the use of force 
to specific locations for specific purposes—all overseas.  Conversely, the 
WSLA was “not intended to apply to . . . military actions not specifically 
authorized by Congress pursuant to the War Powers Resolution.”116  Thus, 
alleged criminal actions by a soldier—engaged as a contractor or not—
committed solely within the confines of the United States without a 
connection to the GWOT is most assuredly beyond the reach of the WSLA. 
Again, offenses involving fraud under the WSLA are “limited strictly to 
offenses in which defrauding or attempting to defraud the United States is 
an essential ingredient of the offense charged.”117  Bridges v. United States118 
held that the WSLA did not apply to offenses outside defrauding the United 
States “in any pecuniary manner or in a manner concerning property.”119  
In contrast, the Court has also held that the WSLA applied “to false claims 
for wool purchases from a federal agency . . . because defrauding the federal 
government was ‘an essential ingredient of  the offenses charged.’”120  In 
this context, to determine whether WSLA should apply to the criminal 
offenses alleged against Mr. Jucutan, a soldier and also a contractor with 
DOCUPAK, the court must evaluate the elements of the charged offense 
and the nexus to wartime activity.121 
D. Military Contractors—What Was the Army Thinking? 
Like all other RAs, Mr. Jucutan was employed by DOCUPAK as a 
contractor and performed his contract requirements under AR-RAP outside 
of the scope of any wartime activity.  Further, the military provided limited 
guidance on how DOCUPAK established and administered the subject 
 
115. S. REP. NO. 110-431, at 4 (2008). 
116. Id. 
117. DeLia, 906 F.3d at 1217. 
118. Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953). 
119. Id. at 221. 
120. DeLia, 906 F.3d at 1219 (quoting United States v. Grainger, 346 U.S. 235, 237, 241–45 
(1953)). 
121. Id. at 1219–21. 
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contract, making that entire relationship and performance of activity beyond 
the intent of the WSLA. 
Civilian parent-contracting companies function under individualized 
contracts either directly with the DOD or with other federal agencies.  
Because  overseas military operations give rise to their fair share of untoward 
activities caused by negligent or intentional acts, including wrongful deaths 
and accidents, it is not surprising that during the GWOT parent-contracting 
companies have faced a number of civil lawsuits emanating from the acts of 
their civilian employees, other contractors, military personnel, and host-
nation foreigners. 
    An often raised “defense” employed by contracting companies in the 
litigation process is the political question doctrine, which, if adopted by the 
court, serves as a complete jurisdictional bar to the suit.122  Even if the 
plaintiff’s lawsuit is appropriate and meritorious as to every other procedural 
and substantive matter, the political question doctrine renders the case non-
justiciable.  In other words, it cannot be heard. 
    How to identify a non-justiciable political question is set out in Baker 
v. Carr.123  The so-called Baker inquiry lists six separate factors, any one of 
which renders the case non-justiciable.124  The six Baker factors are: 
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding 
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial 
discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent 
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of 
government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political 
decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from 
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.125 
The Baker factors are broadly defined and apparently listed in descending 
order of importance, with the first and second factors providing the most 
 
122. See Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) (“The Political 
question doctrine excludes from judicial review those controversies which revolve around policy 
choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or 
the confines of the Executive Branch.”). 
123. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
124. Id. at 217. 
125. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277–78 (2004) (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).  
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weight.126  Each case mandates “a discriminating analysis of the particular 
question posed, in terms of the history of its management.”127  One of the 
most critical elements is the amount of command and control that the 
military has over the particular contract and contractor.  The greater the 
level of military command and control, the greater the probability that the 
requisite Baker factors will be invoked to bar the civil suit. 
For instance, the 2006 case of Smith v. Halliburton Co.128 involved a cause 
of action against a civilian contractor who operated a dining facility on 
Forward Operating Base (FOB) Marez in Mosul, Iraq.129  In 
December 2004, a suicide bomber entered the dining facility, detonated 
explosives packed with shrapnel, and murdered twenty-two people.130  The 
court applied the Baker factors and determined that the contractor was 
operating pursuant to the military’s orders, instructions, regulations, and 
protection, and therefore the contractor was under military control, making 
the case non-justiciable.131 
    On the other hand, in McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc.,132 the 
Eleventh Circuit upheld a lower court’s denial of a motion to dismiss based 
on the political question doctrine.133  Although the civilian contractor 
company Presidential Airways (Presidential) was under military contract to 
provide transportation support to the DOD in Afghanistan, it could not 
satisfy any of the Baker factors in a negligence lawsuit filed by survivors of 
a Presidential plane crash, killing all aboard.134  The Eleventh Circuit 
dismissed the first Baker factor, finding that while the military was involved 
in choosing the starting and ending points of various Presidential flights, the 
military’s role in directing the activities was “relatively discrete.”135  Because 
the court felt the facts demonstrated minimal military involvement and the 
type of claim was squarely in the realm of a negligence claim, the remaining 
Baker factors were disposed of in quick step. 
 
126. Id. at 278. 
127. McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1365 n.36 (11th Cir. 2007), aff’g 
460 F. Supp. 2d 1315 (M.D. Fla. 2006). 
128. Smith v. Halliburton Co., No. H-06-0462, 2006 WL 2521326 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2006). 
129. Id. at *1. 
130. Id.  
131. Id. at *6–7. 
132. McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2007), aff’g 460 F. Supp. 
2d 1315 (M.D. Fla. 2006). 
133. Id. at 1361. 
134. Id. at 1337, 1365. 
135. Id. at 1361. 
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In the case of DOCUPAK, this civilian contracting company operated 
outside of any theater of combat and was provided little guidance and 
oversight from the military as to how to organize or run the G-RAP and 
AR-RAP initiatives.  Thus, DOCUPAK would certainly fail to satisfy any of 
the Baker factors.136  DOCUPAK and the individual RA “military” contractor 
who worked for DOCUPAK were far removed from any real connection to 
the GWOT and, by extrapolation, far removed from the letter and spirit of the 
WLSA.  While it is undeniable that the RA working for DOCUPAK 
provided some service to the military in the sphere of reaching certain 
enlistment goals, those services were not connected to combat-related 
actions on the battlefield or in direct support of wartime activities. 
When the Ninth Circuit held that the WSLA applied to the criminal 
offenses alleged against Mr. Jucutan it mistakenly applied the WSLA to 
criminal offenses “committed in connection with 
the . . . performance . . . of any contract . . . which is . . . directly connected 
with or related to [congressionally] authorized use of the Armed Forces.”137  
In fact, the government failed to show that AR-RAP itself is “directly 
connected with or related to the authorized use of the Armed Forces.”138  
Amazingly, the Ninth Circuit seemed satisfied by the government’s 
haphazard reliance on a work statement for AR-RAP to show that the 
program was directly connected with or related to the AUMF: 
[A]s the Army Reserve (AR) transitions from a stand-by reserve to an 
operational reserve there still remains challenges for the Global War on Terror 
(GWOT) and for manning the AR.  The current strength of the Selected 
Reserve (SELRES) is just under 195K; missing end-strength goal by 10K.139 
This AR-RAP work statement fails to expand the narrow authorization 
of the AUMF and AUMFAI.140  Again, only a congressionally authorized 
use of military force activates the WSLA’s suspension of the applicable 
 
136. See United States v. Osborne, 886 F.3d 604, 606 (6th Cir. 2018) (stating DOCUPAK is a 
private corporation); Memorandum to the Members of the Subcomm. on Fin. and Contracting 
Oversight, supra note 14, at 7 (“The National Guard Bureau also failed to obtain sufficient legal reviews 
for any of the G-RAP contracts awarded to Docupak.”). 
137. 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (2018). 
138. Id. 
139. United States v. Jucutan, No. 16-10452, 2018 WL 6445749, at *3 (9th Cir. 2018) (Berzon, 
J., dissenting). 
140. 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (2017). 
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statute of limitations.141  The government has made no effort to show that 
the need to recruit more troops for the Army Reserve was “directly 
connected with or related to the authorized use” of military force under the 
AUMF or AUMFAI.  Additionally, the charged offenses against 
Mr. Jucutan—wire fraud142 and aggravated identity theft143—contain no 
element which requires Mr. Jucutan to have defrauded the United States 
government.144  
Furthermore, as previously delineated, the Supreme Court has applied the 
WSLA to toll the limitations period only when the alleged fraud was an 
“essential ingredient of the offense charged.”145  Defrauding the U.S. 
government is not an essential ingredient of the charged offenses—wire 
fraud and aggravated identity theft—because neither offense requires 
Mr. Jucutan to have defrauded the U.S. government.146  
IV.    CONCLUSION 
The G-RAP may have increased the ranks of the National Guard at a 
time when it was needed, but it left in its wake a legacy of destroyed lives of 
many innocent RAs.  According to all open-source information, the CID 
never accounted for even a fraction of the alleged 92 million dollars in so-
called fraud in the recruiter programs.147  Ironically, far more money was 
spent “investigating” innocent RAs for the sole purpose of getting 
individuals “titled.”  Regardless of what the outcome might be as to how the 
cases were disposed of, the CID could boast that they had at least discovered 
significant numbers of wrongdoers, as evidenced by numerous “successfully 
concluded” ROIs.  Of course, Task Force Raptor may be over, but the 
repercussions associated with being “titled” will continue to haunt the 
innocent for years to come—both in the military and civilian world. 
It is time that the DOD order a complete and detailed independent review 
of all ROIs related to Task Force Raptor.  Not only must the DOD take 
 
141. See id. (outlining the requirements for a wartime suspension of limitations). 
142. Id. § 1343. 
143. Id. § 1028A. 
144. See id. § 1343 (showing defrauding the U.S. government is not an element of wire fraud); 
id. § 1028A (lacking an element which would require defrauding the government). 
145. United States v. DeLia, 906 F.3d 1212, 1217 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting Bridges v. United 
States, 346 U.S. 209, 221 (1953)). 
146. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2008) (demonstrating no requirement of defrauding the government); 
18 U.S.C. § 1028A (2004) (providing no element requiring the government be defrauded). 
147. See NGA G-RAP REPORT, supra note 9, at 3 (indicating only $900,000 was accounted for 
as fraudulently paid out). 
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immediate steps to delete all those cases from the CID “title” systems where 
the command has found the RA innocent of wrongdoing, but all those CID 
investigators that conducted sham “telephone-styled” ROI must be held to 
account. 
Finally, in light of the Supreme Court’s inaction to deal with the statute 
of limitations issue posed by the WSLA, Congress must amend the WEFA 
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